Frenemies: After PKK Disarms, Erdoğan’s Media Hints at DEM Party Joining Ranks with AKP-MHP Bloc

Many also downplayed the need for a new constitution when Bahçeli kicked off the Peace Process 2.0, yet the 2nd hottest topic today is precisely that: a new constitution without a referendum.

Former AKP MP and journalist Şamil Tayyar recently appeared on TGRT Haber’s Medya Kritik program, where he made a striking prediction: that the pro-Kurdish DEM Party will “most likely” join the Erdoğan-Bahçeli (AKP-MHP) alliance. You can watch that segment below—but first, some context on who Tayyar is, and why his words matter.

A prominent figure in Turkish media since the early 2000s, Tayyar began his career in 1985, writing for mainstream outlets like Milliyet and Sabah, before moving to more overtly Islamist papers such as Yeni Şafak, Tercüman, and Star—publications that, while more ideologically driven, have consistently had lower circulation or click-through numbers compared to their mainstream counterparts. Though much of Turkey’s media was gradually absorbed into pro-Erdoğan ownership, Tayyar aligned himself with these more hardline outlets.

He entered parliament as an AKP deputy from Gaziantep in 2011 and served until 2018. While he formally stepped back from active politics in 2020, he remains involved through the AKP’s Central Decision and Executive Board (MKYK). Tayyar is fiercely loyal to Erdoğan but has been openly critical of the “technocratic advisers” surrounding him—particularly after being left out of the MKYK following the party’s 4th Extraordinary Congress in 2023. Over the years, he’s emerged as a kind of unofficial mouthpiece—often seen as floating trial balloons on behalf of the Erdogan`s palace.

Below, you’ll find his take on what a post-PKK disarmament landscape could look like.

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Let’s assume a positive outcome. Suppose terrorism comes to a complete end, the PKK officially dissolves, the decision is fully implemented, and the YPG disappears altogether. Let’s imagine a scenario where Turkey is finally free of terrorism, and a strong wave of peace and stability prevails over the next two years.

In such an environment, the entire political landscape would be reshaped. First, the DEM Party would undergo a transformation. It would no longer be influenced by Kandil (the PKK leadership base) but instead would become a party directly guided by İmralı (Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned PKK leader). Öcalan wouldn’t be an overt political figure, but he could assume a role akin to a “natural leader” of the party, setting its agenda and appointing key figures from İmralı.

Of course, we’re speculating — it’s impossible to predict how circumstances will evolve. However, such a shift could trigger a split between the DEM Party and the Turkish left. Historically, the Turkish left has been highly critical of any peace negotiations with the AKP. We’re already seeing signs of this tension surface again in public discourse.

If the DEM Party embraces a new direction under İmralı’s guidance, the Turkish left may seek to distance itself. There’s already talk of forming a new left-wing bloc under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP). I think the chances of this becoming a reality are high. In this case, the DEM Party would shed the constraints of the left and emerge as a standalone political entity — with Öcalan firmly in control.

Such a transformation could also open up new political alignments. If the peace process succeeds, DEM could become a new component of the People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı aka Erdogan-Bahceli allience). Let me be very clear here: throughout all stages of the negotiations befor PKK`s self-abolishment, there has never been any discussion about extending the President’s term through constitutional amendments or early elections. That has simply never been on the table.

But again, if the peace process proves successful and DEM becomes part of the governing alliance, a new kind of political cooperation could emerge. This would significantly disrupt the CHP’s political projections. After all, the CHP won key municipalities and built its presidential ambitions largely with DEM's support. If DEM changes sides, the CHP will have to seek new partners to remain electorally viable. Without DEM, it would be nearly impossible for them to reach the 50%+1 threshold needed to win the presidency.

In such a scenario, I expect the rise of a nationalist front. This could include the İYİ Party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi), and potentially others, evolving into a broader nationalist-conservative alliance. Even the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah) could join. While DEVA’s Ali Babacan might offer cautious support to the peace process, I doubt he and his team would ever fully join the People’s Alliance.

This shift might also prompt the CHP to reconsider its presidential candidate. Now, I know some people will take what I’m about to say out of context, but I’ll say it anyway: If CHP’s alliance with DEM falls apart and it looks to realign with a more nationalist bloc — perhaps with İYİ Party, Zafer Party, and Yeniden Refah — they might feel the need to nominate a candidate who can better appeal to a conservative-nationalist voter base. In that case, Mansur Yavaş could be favored over Ekrem İmamoğlu.

Again, this is speculative. It all depends on how the political conditions evolve. But the CHP would need to replace DEM with a comparably strong political partner. DEM currently polls around 9–10%. While İYİ Party alone doesn’t match that, a combination of İYİ Party and Yeniden Refah could generate a similar level of support and even create new momentum.

So, this new political alignment could significantly influence the choice of presidential candidate. The bottom line is that Turkey’s political alliances are fluid. We may see new coalitions, changing partnerships, and different presidential contenders emerging. It’s a dynamic and unpredictable landscape.

And of course, if the peace process succeeds, the economic and social benefits would be enormous — that’s beyond debate.